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In projecting educational expansion at different levels of schooling into the future for 
the world’s countries, this chapter weighs numerous theoretical perspectives against 
each other in terms of their predictive implications. The explanations for the global 
expansion of formal schooling since the mid-20th century derived from these different 
perspectives emphasize different social, political, and economic factors as well as 
different characterizations of the growth logic intrinsic to the education system itself. 
This analysis implies a projection model that assumes continued diffusion, with 
country-specific variation around a typical path of expansion from low shares of 
population attainment at a given level of schooling to its near universalization. Such a 
model is estimated on reconstructed attainment data and projected into the future to 
provide a baseline scenario. This is complemented by additional scenarios formalizing 
more rapid or stagnant educational growth. 
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1 Introduction 
Education is an inherently long-term endeavor. Not only in the sense that formal 
schooling alone may last a significant part of a life-time, but also because part of the 
reason for spending this time in school is the promise of benefits for decades to come. 
This is true at both the individual and societal levels. 
For the underlying educational systems, the long-term nature of education is felt 
more keenly than at the individual level. Schools are built to serve multiple generations 
of students, and teachers are often hired for life as civil servants. A newly trained 
teacher of today will, towards the end of her career, teach students who, in turn, may 
well still be in the active labor force a hundred years from now. 
Educators themselves also hold expectations about the long-term future. Part of 
why we care whether a Dalit boy gets some form of early childhood education is 
because we expect that as a consequence, his increased chances to complete school will 
benefit him not only for the next 10 or 15 years, to the end of our program intervention 
or planning horizon, but for the rest of his life. His own education may even make it 
more likely that he will send his own children to school. If he sends a daughter to 
school, her education will possibly lead her to wait until she is in her late 20s to bear her 
first child, when she is better able to provide care. That “delayed benefit” of the Dalit 
boy going to school now might not occur until sometime in the 2050s. 
To insist that we “learn for life, not for school” is a cliché, yet there are 
strikingly few attempts to look ahead—much less project quantitatively—how today’s 
students will contribute to the educational composition of tomorrow’s population, and 
the implications for their personal life course and the challenges of their generation. 
Some of the key contemporary policy debates concern very long-term issues. Among 
these are the sustainability of pensions, the provision of health care, and responding to 
environmental degradation. For all of these, the education of the concerned populations 
matters. Conversely, these debates have serious consequences for education today, such 
as public funding cuts motivated by the aspiration to reduce future public debt. 
Informing these debates from a perspective of educational futures requires an 
attempt to abstract away the vagaries of never-ending educational policy reforms that, at 
first glance, appear to render any concrete attempts to look into the future an exercise in 
speculation. Yet, given the proven difficulty of achieving set objectives through 
deliberate policy changes, it is all too easy to overstate the problem they cause for 
projection. Even less successful than long-term forecasts of education have been 
predictions of its imminent radical change. 
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On a different level, tremendous differences exist in what nominally equivalent 
school qualifications in different settings actually mean, either in terms of knowledge 
and skills or in terms of societal reward. On educational grounds, we have no reason to 
expect nominal attainment levels to distinguish groups of people with identifiably 
distinct, and generalizable, demographic behaviors; yet mark such distinctions they do, 
as the empirical evidence presented in Lutz et al. (2013) demonstrates. For marking 
such distinctions, and as a characteristic that is stable over the life course, taking an 
interest in the educational attainment profile of future populations is prudent. Not least, 
the demographic consequences of educational expansion are relatively predictable 
compared to projections of economic and poverty impacts (Hannum and Buchmann 
2005). 
Forecasting in the sense of predicting is certainly impossible. And there is no 
possibility of conducting meaningful planning over such a generational time horizon. 
Not because this would necessarily require predictions as inputs—it does not—but 
because in any case there can be no credible commitments that far into the future. What 
is possible is to place explicit bounds on what we can and do know about the future; 
within those bounds we can form reasonable expectations, even if the expectations 
remain open to further revision. Indeed, some of the potential benefits of thinking 
systematically about the future of educational attainment lie not in the results, but in 
potentially highlighting contradictions in our thinking. The education development 
community generally asserts that a “GDP growth first” development strategy cannot 
substitute for an active education policy. From such a position, it would be inconsistent 
to deny the relevance of long-term projections of education by arguing that schooling 
will anyhow become virtually universal within our lifetime due to increasing wealth. 
Such ambivalence reflects long-standing, and unresolved, debates among 
educationalists between the poles of seeing structural “periodicity and process” (Archer 
1982, p. 3) in educational expansion, and calling such generalizations into question with 
reminders of the importance of accounting for contextual and historical specificity when 
assessing a concrete educational policy challenge. We believe the latter perspective is 
essential for well-grounded educational action. Nevertheless, we do not think it 
invalidates the effort to seek “stabilities and governing principles” in the “emergence 
and development of educational systems” (Ericson 1982, p. 300). Indeed, the 
international consensus surrounding the quintessential elements of a public school 
system appears to be shifting from being almost universal, to being truly so. 
Today, of the 199 countries on which UNESCO reports, 98 percent require 
children to attend school (UNESCO 2012, pp. 18–19), up from 90 percent in 2002 
(Benavot et al. 2006).This fact reflects a widespread belief that formal education should 
be, at least up to a basic level, provided or supported by the State. The motivations for 
formalizing education and developing state-sponsored systems of mass education have 
varied by context. Widely different pressures, goals, and priorities have supported 
public education development across time and place. Yet despite such differences, the 
pattern and structures of educational development exhibit remarkable similarity in many 
societies.  
Education by the most liberal definition is at least as old as civilization, but here 
we are not addressing informal learning occurring in the home, provided by families or 
the immediate community, or even learning occurring in the workplace after 
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matriculation. While these forms of education are fundamental to individual 
development, the current discussion refers only to formal, systematized schooling. Thus, 
the following sections will briefly examine the history of educational expansion with 
respect to formal schooling, focusing on commonalities and differences in its structures 
and progress across time and place, as well as theories regarding the motivations and 
processes of educational development in different contexts. In a novel step, we then 
derive the predictive content of these empirical patterns and theoretical frameworks. 
Part II presents a specific statistical projection model based on these insights. 
 
Figure 1. Empirical country trajectories of expanding primary education attainment in 
the 30-34 age group, arranged around global average time since reaching 50% 
attainment share (c.f. Section 3). 
2 Dynamics of Educational Expansion 
2.1. Historical Overview 
Similarities across time and place in educational structures, as well as the motivations 
for educational expansion, have long been noted. Until modern times, formal education 
was—in practice and intention—a privilege of only the elite classes of society, e.g., 
those serving as civil or religious authorities. Trades and skills were passed down over 
generations within families or through apprenticeships. While a handful of ancient 
societies supported systems of formal education, mass literacy—especially with any 
sense of gender parity—was a rare occurrence until relatively recently. Literacy 
education was traditionally linked to social privilege, and there are numerous instances 
in history where the withholding of literacy education was a means of oppression. 
However, over the past two centuries, a level of expansion in mass schooling has 
occurred that indicates the emergence of an alternative paradigm. Societies worldwide 
appear to recognize that providing basic education—fundamental skills in literacy and 
numeracy—improves quality of life for persons of disparate social and economic 
backgrounds and, by eliminating inequality, benefits the whole of society. The historic 
motivations to offer formal basic education have varied widely and signified local 
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social, economic, and political concerns (Benavot et al. 2006). In the West, the 
Reformation brought forward the belief that all individuals must have the capability to 
read and interpret scripture for themselves, and as a result, basic education came to be 
seen as a fundamental requirement. This is one reason why churches were often the 
initial stewards of educational instruction across Europe. In part this was because 
monasteries had been the only providers of schooling and literate material for centuries 
(Cordasco 1976).and Literacy for religious purposes is still a motivating factor in the 
organization of formal education in areas like Northern Africa, where Qur’anic schools, 
in addition to instruction in local languages, teach Arabic literacy for scriptural 
understanding, as has been done for centuries. 
During the 18th and 19th centuries, education was also seen as a means to 
provide moral instruction to emergent citizenries, as the role of the church as moral 
leader declined during this period of rapid secularization and modernization. Because 
the formalization of mass education systems coincided with industrialization, some 
analysts have theorized that education systems were created to provide the necessary 
skills for a productive workforce and create a rational sorting mechanism for employers. 
We also see evidence that nation-states elect to formulate mass education systems as a 
means of generating legitimacy on the world stage, often adopting the formal structures 
of other nations’ educational systems and creating identical systems of symbolic links 
between the individual and society (Meyer 1992). This motivation is plausible, since in 
many cases, the formal education system appeared at the same time that the nation-state 
emerged. 
In the contemporary era, the initiation of a formal, mass educational system 
typically involves several signals of commitment (Boli et al. 1985). Although in some 
cases a formal education system predates an official statute (and in some cases a system 
predates the nation-state), nation-states have commonly begun by adopting laws 
regarding compulsory education, which often mandate an age at which education must 
begin and the years of duration to reach a required minimum level of schooling. 
Ministries of education are also commonly authorized, whose function is to implement 
programs, set benchmarks, develop curricula, and to monitor and report progress. 
Education entities also tend to adopt uniform, hierarchical systems, i.e., primary 
education that leads to secondary education, which in turn is required for entry to 
tertiary education. This is enabled by standardization, which tends to coincide with 
centralization of the educational system. 
Importantly, educational expansion has followed rather typical patterns across 
all world regions (Wils and Goujon 1998). Initially, there is a focus on primary or 
“basic” education that provides fundamental skills such as literacy and numeracy. Once 
a stable level of primary educational participation is achieved, expansion into secondary 
schooling occurs, where the curriculum is characterized by greater skill specificity. 
However, expansion of secondary education does not necessarily follow universal 
primary enrolment. In some cases, e.g., in Africa and Latin America, secondary 
education has developed even in the midst of high levels of illiteracy and low levels of 
primary completion. In such contexts where primary educational expansion is growing 
slowly, secondary education enrolment is confined to the more economically 
advantaged echelons of society. For instance, prior to World War II secondary 
education in Europe was relatively selective and was considered to serve primarily as 
preparation for university. After World War II, however, a new political climate in 
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Europe led to increased inclusiveness and longer periods of free, compulsory education, 
resulting in virtually universal secondary participation. 
Then, as nations mature and secondary enrolment levels rise, tertiary enrolment 
expands. Although university education is at least 1,000 years old, this stage of 
educational development is still underway, and the final shape that global tertiary 
expansion will take is still being determined. For many centuries, tertiary education 
served only a very small minority such as clerical, medical, or legal specialists, but over 
the past century, enrolments have grown tremendously. During the 20th century tertiary 
enrolments increased by a factor of 200, from around half a million people of college 
age, to more than 100 million (UNESCO 2004, cited in Schofer and Meyer 2005), and 
between 1950 and 1970, enrolments in higher education grew faster than in any other 
level (Meyer et al. 1977). Schofer and Meyer (2005) found that higher education 
enrolments grew rapidly in conjunction with global democratization, scientization, 
growth in human rights, and involvement in development planning. These variables 
proved more important than secondary enrolments, inequality, research and 
development levels, or economic development at the country level (although country-
level secondary enrolments were positively related to tertiary enrolments). Moreover, 
higher education institutions tend to be similar world-wide, both in what is taught and 
how the curriculum is delivered. This suggests that the recent expansion of higher 
education is the result of global cultural and symbolic forces emphasizing the value of 
advanced forms of knowledge and its potential to generate capital in many forms—
economic, social, and intellectual. Countries invest in higher education to meaningfully 
participate in, and integrate into, the global discourse of progress and human 
development. 
2.2. Theoretical Perspectives 
The body of research examining educational expansion has considered the timing and 
pace of formal education’s development along with antecedents of historical context 
and socio-political conditions. The different themes in the historical overview—social 
privilege, nationalism, industrialization—have served as organizing principles for 
different theories to explain the diverse conditions under which educational expansion 
has taken place. While points of overlap exist, to date these theories largely remain as 
competing explanations, and a “grand theory” of educational growth that would 
reconcile the different explanatory paradigms remains elusive. 
The main theories range from functional-structural perspectives that emphasize 
the development of education as a response to society’s social needs, or to maintain 
existing power relationships, to systemic theories that frame educational expansion as a 
feature of an emergent, self-reinforcing world culture.  
2.2.1 Technological Progress and Economic Transformations 
Within the Functionalist paradigm, formal education serves an important function in the 
labor market, where mass schooling systems lead to credentials that allow employers to 
differentiate potential workers in a systematic and objective manner. Credentials may 
legitimate claims of skills learned, but importantly, education provides a skills-
differentiated workforce for the industrial labor force. As a result, economic 
transformations, beginning with the industrial revolution but including more recent 
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shifts towards a service economy, create a demand for the output of the education 
system. In many cases, this pressure has been expansionary and spurred an upgrading of 
qualifications. But while economic development has been considered a prerequisite to 
the emergence of mass schooling, its relationship to educational expansion is certainly 
not straightforward, especially since this relationship is not limited to the labor market. 
For one, the distribution of wealth weighs on the demand for education, because 
demand seems to be proportionally related to household income. Population growth (or 
decline) also affects enrolment rates, since educational infrastructure must be able to 
keep pace with the size of entering cohorts (Colclough and Al-Samarrai 2000). 
Secondary and tertiary educational expansion may be especially affected by economic 
development, for reasons related to both supply and demand. When increased 
industrialization and development of technical infrastructure occur, employers seek out 
workers with more highly specialized skills, such as those provided in secondary or 
tertiary programs (Meyer et al. 1977). At the same time, development can provide 
resources to be invested in the educational infrastructure, creating openings for more 
enrolments.  
While research has examined the extent to which economic development has 
spurred the growth in educational enrolments, to a large extent the motivation behind 
external aid efforts for developing countries’ education sectors historically has revolved 
around the belief that increasing educational enrolments itself leads to economic growth 
(Corrales 2006; Resnik 2006). Recent discourse has additionally emphasized the power 
of education to eliminate poverty and promote sustainable development (Hannum and 
Buchmann 2003). The process whereby education leads to improved economic 
conditions, however, is not well understood and is widely debated, not least because 
empirical verification of the causal relationship is challenging (see the discussion of 
causality between education and selected outcomes in Lutz and Skirbekk 2013). To 
some extent the relationship is one of mutual feedback mechanisms. 
Increasing amounts of education within a population might seem clearly related 
to a country’s economic growth potential, but there are many correlates of both higher 
enrolment rates and economic development. For example, higher levels of female 
primary enrolment are associated with lower fertility rates, and lower fertility rates are 
positively correlated with economic growth. Economic growth is also strongly 
correlated with the openness of the economy and stability, which also likely relate 
strongly to educational investment. Moreover, countries with low initial levels of both 
human capital and GDP tend to grow faster than more developed countries, as a result 
of their lower starting place, which gives the impression that education enrolment 
growth, per se, causes economic development (Barro and Lee 2001). And educational 
quality, as measured by cognitive ability on internationally normed tests in reading, 
math, and science, may matter for economic growth as much as enrolment or attainment 
shares. Studies indicate that aggregate cognitive ability affects economic development 
via a better trained labor force, higher individual incomes, and a more equitable 
distribution of wealth (Barro and Lee 2001; Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008). In effect, 12 years of schooling in one country is not necessarily the 
same as 12 years in another country in terms of actual learning. Learning is also not 
only the purview of the school, as it occurs in the home, the community and among 
peers, the features of which also vary across countries. Furthermore, internal efficiency 
(i.e., school quality) may not coincide with expansion, nor may enrolment growth 
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necessarily lead to appreciable increases in attainment shares. Rapid expansion in 
enrolment is sometimes characterized by an initial decrease in school quality, as stocks 
of qualified teachers must accumulate and funds must be properly allocated in response 
to where needs are greatest. Poor quality can in turn depress overall attainment and 
cognitive ability. Finally, improvements in schooling change the existing population 
stock of human capital only slowly, the contribution of educational expansion to 
economic development, taking age structural effects into account, has been analyzed 
only recently (Lutz et al. 2008) 
2.2.2 Nation States and the Imperatives of Nationalism 
Despite the strong linkages between educational expansion and industrial development, 
the observation that mass educational systems pre-date industrialization, e.g., in Europe 
and the United States (Boli et al. 1985; Meyer 1992; Meyer et al. 1977), and that mass 
educational systems arose only after the appearance of the nation-state, point to a 
dominant role of the latter. Indeed, the earliest modern instances of state-sponsored 
mass education systems explicitly served the purpose of creating citizens for the 
emergent nation-states. In this way, mass formal education is viewed as necessary for 
the development of a coherent, nationalistic, and unifying identity. For instance, in 
Prussia, which in the late 1700s was characterized by geographically isolated city-states, 
a unifying curriculum was perceived as particularly useful for national security and 
consensus building (for a good review of European national education systems, see 
Ramirez and Boli (1987). Even before being legally instituted, some societies provided 
formal education because of normative beliefs about its value as a socializing agent for 
children (Benavot et al. 2006) Over time, as labor markets diversified and populations 
became increasingly diverse in terms of language, norms and religious belief, the home 
as a primary learning environment came to be seen as inadequate. Public schools were 
instituted to offer not just basic skills, but also an orientation to normative civically and 
socially responsible behavior and abilities. Furthermore, public schools were viewed as 
a way to equalize learning opportunities across populations of disparate socioeconomic 
and cultural backgrounds. In some countries, state-run systems of mass schooling were 
legally established to enhance the power of the state, and in many cases to 
simultaneously diminish the historical power of the Church (Archer 1982). 
However, neither a strong centralized effort by a nation-state to define its 
educational system, nor nation-wide standardization (of credential and curricula) is 
necessary. England, the United States, Switzerland and Belgium have fairly de-
centralized national education systems (Benavot et al. 2006). Green (1980) significantly 
notes that the structure of an educational system tends to reflect the philosophy and 
exigencies of the country. Systems in Southeast Asia, for instance, educate vastly 
diverse linguistic and ethnic groups, which necessitates a higher degree of 
centralization. However, other nations with diverse populations place a higher value on 
autonomy than unification. The United States, for example, has a long tradition of 
federalism (i.e., states’ rights) that is reflected in its widely-varying state education 
agencies. 
The dominant role of the state in the effective supply of schooling is 
uncontested, even if the question of whose interests it serves is. In addition, however, at 
all but the most advanced levels of educational development, the state apparatus 
likewise influences the demand. In European countries well into the 1970s, the labor 
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market for tertiary graduates was essentially limited to the public sector and publicly-
regulated professions. Similar patterns can be observed in many developing countries, 
where the prospect of a public sector civil service job may be a dominant motivation for 
seeking formal schooling. 
 
Box 1: The example of the Republic of Korea 
Figure 2. Absolute enrolments over time 
 
Figure 3. Upper Secondary Attainment at Age 30-34 
continued on next page 
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The education system in Korea expanded greatly over the course of the second half of 
the twentieth century. As can be seen in Figure 2, while absolute enrolments in primary 
schooling, which was virtually universal, started declining in the 1970s due to shrinking 
cohort size, secondary enrolments more than doubled in 15 years. In relative terms 
(Figure 3), this was the result of extending the secondary franchise from a minority of 
children to virtual universality. The overall shape of the expansion of secondary 
attainment also provides an excellent example of the theoretical sigmoid pattern (i.e., an 
s-shape). Increasing public and private investments in education grow even more, with 
the education sector as a whole increasing more than 100-fold in real GDP between 
1960 and 1980 (Kim 2012, p. 3). 
While such dynamics appear to point to a determined “all-out” effort to maximize 
educational attainment, these figures must be interpreted in context. After decades of a 
slowly increasing share, Korea’s Ministry of Education's budget only reached 20% of 
the total government budget in 1985, an unremarkable percentage in international 
comparison. The state’s development strategy was not fully based on rational human 
capital planning to the extent that is often assumed. On the contrary, Jeong and Armer 
argue that the state's shift in economic policy “from light manufacturing to heavy, 
chemical, and high-tech industries [...] spurred a transformation of the South Korean 
economy, [but] it largely ignored the nation's comparative advantage in skilled labour” 
(Jeong and Armer 1994, p. 535). 
While tertiary enrolments grew more than tenfold between 1970 and 2010, Figure 2 
clearly shows that this growth occurred in distinct spurts, reflecting the policy-driven 
process of expansion, and an education system that lacked autonomy. Indeed, up until 
the late 1970s, the tertiary sector was rather small, as the military junta was concerned 
about over-education and actively limited growth at the higher level (Jeong and Armer 
1994). Indeed, most of the higher education in the early 1970s was private rather than 
public (Kim 2012). When tertiary expansion did eventually take off, it was “in response 
to political and class forces rather than economic needs” (Jeong and Armer 1994, p. 
539). 
Indeed, the argument has been made that educational expansion at the secondary and 
higher level in Korea occurred as an unintended consequence of a bipolar dynamic 
between government policy and society. It was precisely the state's earlier efforts to 
contain expansion at the post-primary level that “intensified entrance examination 
competitions, stimulated demand for education, [...] and mobilized private resources for 
education” (Kim 2012, p. 14). Ironically, when the state did react to popular demand 
during a political legitimacy crisis by taking over funding responsibilities for private 
secondary schools, it “laid [the] foundation for universal secondary education and, as 
such, [...] reached far beyond what the public had demanded” (Kim 2012 p. 13). This 
observation provides an example of a “self-propelled” dynamic in educational 




2.2.3 Social Privilege, Status and Conflict 
Functionalist accounts, whether explicitly applied to a global pattern or to a country-
level trend towards modernization, are sharply contradicted by theories locating the 
driving force behind school expansion in social conflict. This view posits that schooling 
expands “to legitimate present inequalities, allowing advantaged classes to retain their 
jobs and cultural forms through a seemingly fair, meritocratic system. Here, the central 
state does not functionally expand mass schooling to pursue society’s ‘common good.’ 
Instead, political actors, captured by elites, serve to reinforce and reproduce economic 
and cultural differences” (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, p. x). More specifically, some 
argue that mass educational systems are organized to reproduce existing inequalities 
over generations and serve the priorities of the elite by creating a skilled and obedient 
working class capable of performing the labor that keeps those with the means of 
production wealthy (Bernstein 1971; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Collins 1971). In a 
related vein, cultural theories argue that educational credentials offered by formal mass 
educational systems offer a way for individuals to signal their privileged status within 
social realms (e.g., social class membership, eligibility for marriage) or the field of 
labor (e.g., entitlement to authority) (Bourdieu 1986). 
Support for this perspective comes from the fact that one of the most important 
predictors of an individual’s educational attainment continues to be his or her parents’ 
educational attainment (Clemens 2004). Parents’ education is an essential determinant 
of family socio-economic status (SES), and home and community SES in turn 
determines a child’s educational and occupational aspirations (Sewell and Hauser 
1980). Countless studies emphasize how important family background is to academic 
performance, as well. Not only does the home environment created by more educated 
parents stimulate higher cognitive ability, it also conditions children’s attitudes toward 
schooling and beliefs about the inherent value of education. Thus, parents with 
relatively high educational attainment tend to raise more educated children.  
Despite the fact that these patterns suggest a great deal of intergenerational 
transfer of status, an inherent amount of individual competition leads at the same time to 
self-sustaining levels of education within a population: as one generation becomes more 
educated, the higher the probability that the next generation will be at least as highly 
educated. Higher levels of participation can create an intrinsic, self-reinforcing demand. 
This is not just true of industrialized societies. A body of research aimed towards 
understanding the reasons for educational expansion grew rapidly during the 1970s, 
when the world was witnessing tremendous expansion in mass schooling systems in 
developing nations across Latin America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
These studies explored a number of contextual differences in economic development, 
political and social modernization, and economic dependencies. The contexts examined 
also varied according to ethnic and linguistic diversity, governmental authority (e.g., 
democracy versus authoritarianism), and degree of centralization. The results suggested 
that educational development within a country is often a self-generating process, 
whereby underlying levels of education create increasing demand over cohorts as higher 
levels of educational attainment become normative. 
At the same time, different dimensions or stages of educational growth respond 
to different processes of social negotiation. Archer (1982), for example, suggests that 
“external transactions” result in increased provision of schooling (e.g., private 
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universities in Latin America), while “internal initiation” results in longer schooling for 
the privileged (e.g., when teachers press for greater differentiation to reflect rising 
professionalization), in contrast to “political manipulation” of the system leading to 
wider access (e.g., the movement towards desegregation of schools in the U.S.). “The 
fact which accounts for the extremely high growth rate is that these three processes of 
negotiation take place conjointly and their effects reinforce each other” (Archer 1982, p. 
25). 
Furthermore, processes of “political manipulation” do not necessarily move 
directly from inequality toward greater equality. As a case in point, we can consider the 
unintended consequences of school desegregation efforts in the U.S. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, after the decision of Brown v. Board of Education led to efforts to better 
balance the racial composition of public schools in recognition of the fact that minority 
concentration was associated with inherently unequal school outcomes, families of more 
affluent backgrounds reacted in ways that ultimately countered such efforts (Massey 
1990). In some cases, parents withdrew their children from the local public schools and 
re-enrolled them in private schools. In other cases, parents left inner cities in search of 
more favorable residential areas where minorities were far less concentrated. In fact, 
this de facto segregation is still a major factor in educational inequality (Kozol 1991). 
Schools are primarily funded from local property taxes, and local property tax revenue 
reflects the local tax base, resulting in vast disparities in revenue across locales. 
Children are most often assigned to the school district closest to their homes, and 
neighborhood segregation is a phenomenon not so easily legislated away. But again in 
response, “school choice” initiatives have been implemented in an attempt to allow 
families in less affluent neighborhood to select schools in more prosperous areas; 
however, it is often the case that families from the most disadvantaged backgrounds 
have been the least likely to exercise this choice, or “choice schools” in segregated areas 
have failed to attract a diverse student population, both of which have resulted in further 
concentration of disadvantage in schools (Frankenberg et al. 2010). 
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Box 2: The example of the United States 
 
Figure 4. Absolute enrolments over time 
 
Figure 5. Post-secondary Attainment at Age 30-34 




With a focus on the latter part of the twentieth century when primary education was 
universal and high school completion stable at a relatively high level in the U.S., the 
main dynamic in the education sector, in addition to overall growth to keep pace with 
population growth, has been at the post-secondary and tertiary levels. Figure 4 shows 
how tertiary enrolments, while undergoing sometimes decade-long periods of 
stagnation, more than doubled in total between 1970 and 2010. This dynamic is not 
immediately evident in the attainment distribution at age 30-34, though (Figure 5). 
Partly, this is because the latter is lagged relative to enrolments, and does not yet fully 
reflect the enrolment expansion that occurred since 2000. 
Enrolments only translate into attainment if students successfully complete their 
courses. In this context, parts of the enrolment growth driven by community colleges 
that enjoy lower completion rates than academic 4-year colleges, contribute 
proportionally less to attainment growth. Another reason that growth in tertiary 
completion rates in the U.S. may slow somewhat is that, compared to other developed 
countries, the financial cost of a college education in the U.S. is substantial and growing 
rapidly. In 2007-08, the average full-time 4-year college enrollee spent $19,100 a year 
(including room, board, tuition, materials). This figure represented a 22% increase over 
the cost just 8 years prior in 1999-00. More recent estimates suggest that tuition in some 
places has nearly doubled in 10 years. While this trend may in fact stratify options 
across different socioeconomic groups (e.g., poor minorities less likely to enroll), 
innovative means by which to pay for college are growing.  
In addition, composition effects depress the expansion of U.S. post-secondary and 
tertiary attainment, as a result of population heterogeneity. Growth in college 
completion rates over the past 30 years has not occurred uniformly across demographic 
groups. Between 1971 and 2009, white students’ bachelor degree completion share 
increased from 19% to 37%. For Blacks, it increased from 7% to 19%; for Hispanics 
from 5% to only 12%. Thus, although college completion is increasing for all three 
groups, minority groups’ college completion has not increased as fast as for white 
students. At the same time, this supports the view that in the long run, further expansion 
can be expected, since college completion is increasing for all subgroups.  
Labor market dynamics continue to encourage further upgrading of qualifications, as 
income differentials by educational attainment remain high. In 2010, an employee with 
a college education earns on average 66% more in weekly earnings than an employee 
with only a high school diploma (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012a). In the next decade, 
occupations requiring some postsecondary education are projected to grow the most 
(i.e., management, scientific, technical consulting, and computer systems design), while 
those requiring secondary or less will decline the most (i.e., manufacturing and retail 




2.2.4 Emerging Global Norms 
In the contemporary, globally-connected world, the needs of nation-states are not 
limited to creating favorable conditions within their own borders, but include successful 
participation in international systems of political and economic cooperation. The state’s 
engagement in education, therefore, is guided not just by the considerations outlined in 
the preceding sections, of achieving specific outcomes in the form of well-educated 
citizens and productive workers. It is also guided by the desire to signal its adherence to 
emerging global norms. In other words: “mass schooling spreads like a social 
movement, allowing the state to signal that it is modern and efficacious” (Fuller and 
Rubinson 1992, p. x). Systemic theories (i.e., World Culture theories) positing the 
emergence or existence of a world system, a world society, or a world culture, as they 
refer to educational development, all point to the inherent desire of nation-states to 
legitimize themselves on the world stage via the adoption of common ideologies, 
institutions, and organizational systems. This “isomorphization” is seen as a way for 
countries to signal their validity to proximate nation-states, as they adopt the same 
symbolic systems of legitimation as their peers (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer 
1992). A system of mass schooling is an essential institution that can communicate a 
country’s position in the world order. Problems with these theories have been discussed 
elsewhere (Fuller and Rubinson 1992), but perhaps the biggest problem is that they lack 
specificity as to whether development results from actions of individuals, interest 
groups, or states, though it is likely that they are interactive (Jónasson 2003). For 
instance, states may invest in educational infrastructure based on ideals promoted by 
power elites, but individuals or their families must act to enroll. 
Furthermore, it is undeniable that international organizations have played a 
major role in the expansion of mass educational systems worldwide. One of the most 
important milestones in global educational expansion was the establishment in 1946 of 
the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which 
was granted the authority to make policy recommendations and provide technical 
assistance concerning educational progress in specific countries, and to inform efforts 
undertaken by other international economic organizations (Chabbott 1998). The 
sustained commitment of groups like UNESCO, the United Nations Children’s 
Education Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and other country-specific aid organizations (e.g., USAID, Canadian 
International Development Agency) have given rise to an enormous field of research 
and associated professional communities devoted to educational development. These 
organizations have initiated several international conferences intended to advance a 
framework for universal literacy, universal primary enrolment (UPE), and gender 
equality within education (i.e., Education for All), or the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Such efforts have built off other initiatives, such as Health for All, and 
infer authority from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Rights of 
Children. 
The fundamental tension between World Culture Theory and conflict-based 
accounts of educational dynamics becomes evident when the former is characterized as 
being predicated on two assumptions: “the existence of significant commonality across 
societies (convergence) and, by implication, the view of change as primarily a 
derivative of consensual cultural processes (consensus)” (Carney et al. 2012, p. 373). 
World Culture Theory emphasizes that “the fact that the system may originally have 
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been pieced together by elites is no longer the salient point. Now everyone accepts the 
credibility of modern schools, states, and workplaces: These provide understood rules 
for achievement, common paths towards higher status, and seemingly just ways of 
distributing material goods” (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, p. x). However, while at some 
level, the occurrence of convergence is an empirical question, it cannot be fully decided 
by empirical observation alone, because superficial convergence in form does not 
necessarily entail “deep” normative convergence. 
However, identifying global processes as driving educational growth does not 
imply that such processes are necessarily consensus-driven. At their best, the efforts of 
international aid organizations reflect a sincere belief in promoting better outcomes in 
people’s lives globally. But others argue that these efforts reflect pre-WWII colonial 
dependencies and Western biases, create unintentional structural problems, and lack 
necessary oversight and accountability (Corrales 2006; de Moura Castro 2002; 
Heyneman 2003). Indeed, there is evidence that supply-side interventions ill-adapted to 
local conditions have not had the desired impact, particularly when demand has been 
assumed to be universal but if in fact insufficient. In other words, externally-led efforts 
are unlikely to achievement their desired results when they fail to account for barriers to 
quality schooling or attendance, or fail to account for labor market characteristics, local 
cultural characteristics, or the dynamics that shape demand for education within the 
population. 
Among the most important determinants of increased educational demand are 
labor market demand and household economic factors, which are often more influential 
than supply-side inputs, such as school availability or distance to school (for an 
interesting review, see (Clemens 2004). Developing countries seeking external aid for 
various educational efforts have generally been in a vulnerable position. Given the 
appeal of the loans on offer, and the desire for recognition in the world community, 
such countries face strong incentives to commit to any number of externally-mandated 
reforms (e.g., the decentralization of education systems and devolution of authority to 
local community-centered education agencies), despite the social, economic or 
demographic realities these countries confront (McNeely 1995). As a result, oft-stated 
commitments to certain principles may not translate into actual results. Further, the 
structural reforms to which countries conditionally agree have sometimes had 
unintended and unfortunate consequences. These conditions are otherwise known as 
‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ that typically require countries to cut expenditures on 
sectors seen by outside organizations as inefficient, such as public health or public 
employment. Countries may also be required to privatize certain public-good industries. 
Geo-Jaja and Mangum (2001) note the irony in expecting that de-funding public 
services would have a positive effect on development, since previous international aid 
programs that actually improved economic conditions heavily funded the social service 
sectors (e.g., the Marshal Plan, the New Deal, etc.). In any case, the purposes of these 
loans provided are arguably too broad. Often, goals are non-specific or poorly matched 
to local conditions. Geo-Jaja and Mangum (suggest that educational development plans 
should be better aligned with actual labor market needs and should take into account the 
changes to the market occurring in a re-structured economy. 
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2.2.5 Autonomous Systemic Dynamics of the Education Sector 
In contrast to functional-structural explanations, a different explanatory framework 
focuses on, “the internal laws of the system [in order] to ask from a fresh perspective 
whether its behavior is controlled or guided by its relation to the surrounding society or 
whether it is in fact the other way—that the relation of the system to its society is 
determined by its own internal necessities” (Green 1980, p. 112). This approach does 
not deny the ties between the education system and other social structures, but notes that 
the larger the education system, itself, the greater its autonomy (Ericson 1982, p. 306)., 
The positive feedback relation through parents’ ambitions for their children, for 
example, becomes merely one in a number of feedback relations, most of which are 
considered to be intrinsic to the education system itself. This is based not least on the 
observation that frequently, and particularly at early stages of development, the 
education sector tends to be the largest single employer of its own graduates, and 
thereby increasingly able to tailor the system to its own needs. 
Based on empirical analysis, Müller-Benedict (1991) affirms the latter 
interpretation and concludes that the autonomous dynamics of the education system are 
logically prior to functional relationships with other social systems. Evidence in favor of 
this claim is his analysis of university enrolment time series for Germany. Disregarding 
the long-term growth and looking only at fluctuations around the overall trend, internal 
dynamics in terms of two kinds of cycles explain 75 percent of the remaining variance 
in this case. The first type of cycle is characterized by a wavelength (a period between 
peaks) that corresponds roughly to the length of a professional working life, namely in 
the range of 25–40 years. This can intuitively be recognized as fluctuations in 
replacement demand resulting from an uneven age structure within a profession and the 
resulting regular occurrence of large retirement waves. The second regular fluctuation is 
shorter and reflects the anti-cyclical entry behavior into training. In other words, a peak 
(trough) in graduates in a given field entering the labor market encourages a 
corresponding trough (peak) in entrants into training, through the feedback mechanism 
of observed career chances. Since the distance between neighboring peaks and troughs 
is the approximate duration of the relevant training, the wavelength of this fluctuation is 
approximately twice the training duration, namely 8 to 15 years. From a slightly 
different perspective, these can be interpreted as the response of entry flows to observed 
changes in the stock on the one hand, and to changes in the flows of the profession 
being trained for on the other. While the existence of “long” cycles in educational 
growth is controversial, the explanatory power with respect to short-term fluctuations 
actually provides a stronger rationale for considering educational dynamics as being 
largely autonomous. Moreover, under certain conditions the short cycles of twice the 
duration of study experience a destabilizing feedback. Mathematically this leads to an 
arbitrarily increasing amplitude. In practice, of course, this will not occur, because 
pressure on the labor market will result in an increase in the number of skilled positions 
(Müller-Benedict 1991). 
The tight feedback between past and future output of an education system 
naturally hinges on the availability of qualified teachers. Despite external funding 
efforts, one of the most difficult internal constraints on educational expansion is the lack 
of a qualified teaching force. Without an infusion of foreign personnel, a native 
population must build its teaching corps from the underlying stock of qualified persons, 
and in countries with historically low enrolment and fast population growth, this is 
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particularly challenging. In a systematic analysis of teacher shortages, Wils and 
O’Connor (2004) examined the links between gross primary enrolment and a number of 
country-level characteristics, including adult educational attainment, GNP per capita, 
and percent of GNP spent on education. They found that the single largest correlate of 
primary enrolment was the proportion of adults with secondary education. Moreover, in 
countries with a relatively low proportion of adults with secondary education, a very 
large share worked as teachers, implying that a serious impediment to enrolment was 
low educational attainment among the adult population. The authors point out, however, 
that increasing enrolment is a “chicken versus egg” problem (p. 8) , in the sense that an 
increased share of adults qualified to teach primary and secondary education is 
necessary to increase enrolment, while at the same time increasing adult education 
levels requires earlier sustained success with primary and secondary enrolment. In Sub-
Saharan Africa the problem of teacher shortage is particularly stark. Children in such 
education systems may have teachers with barely more education than they have 
themselves. This may either result from efforts to avoid large classes at the expense of 
low teacher qualifications, or occur in addition to large classes. In this sense, poor 
teacher quality could be a self-reinforcing process. 
An emphasis on feedback relations and autonomous behavior driven by systemic 
logic than by external factors does not mean that the behavior of the education system is 
in any way “automatic”. What it does mean is that to a large extent it is the result of the 
behavior of actors within the system applying “practical arguments” (Green 1980) 
which are rational with respect to their situation within the education sector, not 
necessarily with respect to the education sector’s functional relationship with other 
social systems. 
2.2.6 A Tentative Synthesis 
“Mono-causal factors [such] as status-group conflict, the social reproduction of the class 
structure, or the homogenizing characteristics of an evolving world system [are] 
superficially appealing, but inadequate” (Craig and Spear 1982, p. 154). Instead, the 
different general theories “can be seen as simultaneous oscillating processes, each 
operating within a given society but with varying strength over long stretches of time” 
(Fuller and Rubinson 1992, p. 12). With a slightly different focus, Archer cautioned that 
“the possibility/probability that different theories (or theoretical modifications) may be 
needed for different stages of socio-educational development is never even considered” 
(Archer 1982, p. 5). 
Overall, the debate has not advanced significantly in elaborating the conditions 
under which different effects are operative or how their relative importance varies either 
over time or at different levels of development. Instead, the debate has become stuck in 
disagreements about fundamental premises underlying different explanations, and the 
meaning and causal attribution of expansion. At the same time, the different theoretical 
approaches do not necessarily stand in conflict. For example, while not focusing on the 
political aspects of social competition, Green’s systems perspective serves to further 
explicate why educational expansion does not resolve class conflict. This perspective 
implies that as an attainment level is universalized, the last to reach it, “will be 
disappointed because as they attain their target … they will not gain the relative benefits 
that others have secured. They will only have avoided a disaster that is uniquely their 
own” (Green 1980, p. 111). This is both empirically confirmed and conceptually echoed 
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more recently by Raftery and Hout and their notion of “maximally maintained 
inequality” (1993). 
We argue that the different accounts of educational dynamics are not mutually 
contradictory, but could be interpreted as focusing on, respectively: the demand for 
entry (sociological), demand for the product (economic), supply (nation state), and the 
self-interested internal logic of the education sector. Undoubtedly, all these processes 
are at work. For the purpose of educational projection, which is the central program of 
Lutz et al. 2013, the key question is not which of them dominates, but which has stable 
long-term implications, and which result in fluctuations that may be characterized as 
statistical noise. 
A unified perspective, at least on the macro-dynamics, appears possible if the 
hints are taken seriously as to conditions under which each theory applies. For example, 
individualistic status competition for attainment may not be keenly felt in a setting 
where educational participation is extremely low and does not differentiate members of 
the vast majority. It seems likely that “take-off” is driven by an economic need for more 
skilled manpower, and the ensuing rapid expansion to levels over and beyond societal 
needs is driven by status competition, while universalization to the last marginalized 
groups can only be achieved through state intervention under normative pressure. 
This perspective is not pursued any further here. Rather than arbitrating between 
competing explanations, of greatest interest for present purposes is to identify overlaps 
in their implications for future developments, especially in what they identify as deep 
underlying trends, as opposed to fluctuating actions. The different explanations need not 
stand in conflict in terms of their qualitative implications for future expansion. The next 
section attempts to extract such insights. 
2.3. Predictive Content of the Theoretical Models 
The theories outlined above have been formulated by their proponents as explanations 
of observed patterns of expansion, not as vehicles for generating predictions. 
Nevertheless, examining their statements about conditions conducive to educational 
expansion and considering conditions we may expect to prevail in the future provide 
some basis to expect overall sustained expansion in the long run. 
Indeed, one implication of Green’s framework is that “there are reasons to 
believe that the system will expand, even when there is a decline in resources for it and 
a decline in the demand for its services”, termed the “Principle of Uniform Growth” 
(Green 1980, p. 17). One of the reasons is the upgrading of qualification requirements 
within the education system, itself, in response to either an undersupply or an 
oversupply of graduates. This leads to the expectation that, in the long run, everyone 
within the system will have the highest credentials. A consequence of the systemic 
nature of the education sector is that growth at one level tends to stimulate growth at 
another. This applies both in “upstream” and “downstream” directions. An upgrading of 
early-childhood education, for example, leads to an expansion in post-secondary or even 
tertiary training of early-childhood specialists and teachers. Conversely, high targets for 
tertiary attainment stimulate expansion at lower levels in order to supply the pool of 
candidates so selectivity can be maintained at the tertiary stage. Importantly, “this 
principle is not a prediction that the system is always, in fact, expanding or that 
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qualifications for positions within it are always, in fact, increasing” (Green 1980, p. 74), 
but that other behaviors can only occur in response to outside influence. 
Even where internal system dynamics do not provide the propulsion for 
expansion, they can create an upward drift by acting as an expansion “valve” (Müller-
Benedict 1991, p. 144). Several factors serve to ensure that the system has a tendency to 
react only to growth pressures, but not to contract when demand falls. On the face of it, 
a difference between a constant expansionary drift on the one hand, and such a one-way 
“valve” effect on the other, is that the latter only leads to increasing size of the 
education system in terms of its capacity, not necessarily its output. However in 
practice, non-decreasing capacity means that eventual demand increases can always be 
accommodated, so an upward drift in output still follows. 
It is important to note that projections of continued expansion are intended as 
descriptive, not prescriptive accounts of future developments. Indeed, Green and 
colleagues describe how system momentum drives attainment at any level towards 
universality, but explicitly argue that from an equity point of view, a more appropriate 
policy target would be 55–60% high school attainment (which they argue would force 
the labor market to offer valid opportunities to those without a high-school diploma, 
whose number would be too large to ignore). The same applies not to only the final 
level, but also the pace of expansion. Descriptively, we can assert that expansion slows 
down at high levels, while in terms of social equity, it would be desirable to reach 
between 75-100 percent participation as quickly as possible “in order to minimize the 
hardships that will have to be endured by the decreasing percentage of non-attainers” 
(Seidman 1982, p. 285); at the intermediate stage, non-attainment is already a liability. 
Archer likewise diagnoses “unguided growth” of the system as “an unintended 
consequence, sought by no-one and welcomed nowhere” (Archer 1982, p. 55). 
For projections to be meaningful, we need neither an unfounded belief that the 
spread of formal attainment is necessarily “effective, efficient, and equitable” (Carney 
et al. 2012, p. 383), nor an assumed inevitability of continued attainment expansion in a 
way that is consistent with past patterns. Indeed, the partial disagreement Archer 
expressed with Green’s model was not about the regularity in expansion it describes, but 
about whether this regularity reflects an “ineluctable logic” or whether there are merely 
“good reasons, founded in social interactions, why these conditions [leading to 
expansion] are approximated to in reality” (Archer 1982, p. 53) 
We recognize the contingency of expansion on these conditions (hierarchical 
organization of attainment levels and educational credentials as sorting mechanisms), 
but we also note that their persistence is likely, or at least provides a defensible baseline 
hypothesis. It seems more likely that our projections will be falsified because the very 
meaning, or modality, of “formal schooling” changes, than because formal attainment 
growth radically changes its dynamic. It would be misguided to deny the 
meaningfulness of projections by pointing out that policy represents a deliberate and 
purposeful attempt to direct the educational process, and that projections cannot account 
for such future policy changes. We may think of policy and crises as “non-deterministic 
deviations” from a deterministic expectation. Here, “deterministic expectation” does not 
mean that we expect a deterministic trajectory, but that, whatever our expectation is, we 
do not form it by tossing coins 
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This hypothesis of sustained expansion does not contradict the fact that when 
development advocates have attempted to “scale up” successful interventions from one 
place to others, they have found that the contingencies of the context matter 
tremendously. This suggests that interactions between population growth, social 
demand, economic development and the existing stock of human capital are complex 
and do not necessarily allow the imposition of one particular policy of schooling 
expansion onto any setting (Mennerick and Najafizadeh 1987). However, locating the 
driver of expansion in conditions the education systems is likely to endogenously create 
in the long run, explains rather than contradicts the difficulty of bringing about change 
through external policy stimulus. Historical evidence supports this. “In Europe, since 
the late eighteenth century … prior enrollment levels predict subsequent school 
expansion more strongly than the appearance of novel forces, such as rapid commercial 
growth, industrial job demand, and the modern state’s rise and penetration into the 
hinterlands” (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, pp. 23–24). In any case, since changes in the 
external input- and output relations with other systems do not create corresponding 
changes in the education system directly, but only by triggering an autonomous 
response within the system, they are transformed into internal dynamics. The 
implication is that it is sufficient to study only the dynamics of the education system 
itself, without explicit consideration of external factors such as economic development, 
because the consequences of relevant impacts have already been absorbed (Müller-
Benedict 1991, p. 255). 
In summary, in terms of their implications for future developments, there is 
overlap among different theories seeking to explain past attainment growth. This 
overlap points to: continued expansion in the long term; a trend towards (not necessarily 
complete) global convergence; the qualitatively similar expansionary behavior at higher 
education levels now and lower levels before (to the extent that expansion is driven by 
competition and not the substantive benefits directly linked to the educational content); 
and accelerating expansion as a given level of attainment becomes more common. This 
final point occurs because the “cycles of positive reinforcement operating between 
supply and demand, context and environment, and microscopic and macroscopic action” 
are, in general, speeding up (Archer 1982, p. 42). The systems-theoretical accounts 
specifically, as well as the empirical evidence, justify a model seeking to project 
educational attainment endogenously based only on past and current attainment levels. 
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Box 3: The example of Brazil 
 
Figure 6. Absolute enrolments over time 
 
Figure 7. Upper Secondary Attainment at Age 30-34 




While the relative stability in primary enrolments over the past decades (Figure 6) 
already reflects the Brazilian fertility transition, the education system as a whole 
expanded greatly during that time, with secondary and tertiary enrolments increasing 
five-fold despite the presence of a “lost decade” from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s 
(Burton 2011). Even at the primary level, the relatively recent successes in expanding 
participation can still be observed in the attainment of the 30-34 age group. While only 
a minority of both men and women of this age had completed primary school in 1970, 
this share is steadily approaching universality (Figure 7). 
Brazil has shown a strong reduction in inequality in educational participation as a result 
of policies and programs intended to increase both the supply and demand for 
education. At the starting point, the 1970s were characterized by top-down supply-
driven programs, such as the implementation of a law that made school mandatory for 
all children aged 7-14 (the previous law only required schooling for children aged 7-10), 
and a corresponding investment in construction of new schools in order to support new 
entrants. By the 1980s, investments in education stalled, and a number of studies have 
shown evidence of a close relationship between the deep economic crisis (faced by 
Brazil and other countries in Latin America) and poor educational outcomes (Duryea et 
al. 2007; Marteleto et al. 2012; Torche 2010). Indeed, Figure 5 demonstrates a slow 
pace of expansion during that decade. From the point of view of social justice, the 
1980s were actually a success, as the most disadvantaged children were catching up 
faster with the most advantaged children. This indicates that the convergence toward a 
more balanced attainment distribution between groups occurred at the expense of a 
reduction in the aggregate level of education.  
From the mid-1990’s onward, sustained educational policies, which were maintained 
and expanded especially after the Brazilian government transition in 2003, extended 
schooling to even the poorest and most geographically remote children. Among the 
most influential programs were FUNDEF (Fund for the Maintenance and Development 
of Basic Education and Teacher Appreciation), the education finance equalization 
strategy that increased expenditures in the poorest Brazilian regions (North and 
Northeast), and Conditional Cash Transfer Programs that tied the payment of benefits to 
households to the school attendance of their children. 
 
3 A Projection Model for Global Educational Attainment 
Our overall approach consists of two parts: fitting a model of educational development 
trajectories to the empirical development of attainment over the course of recent 
decades; and projecting attainment by extending these trajectories into the future.  
The specifics of both parts are interdependent. Estimating the model is logically 
prior, since it is meaningful without attempting a projection but the converse is not true, 
and the feasible characteristics of the model constrain the form of the projection. 
Examples of such constraints are discussed below. Conversely, the intended primary 
purpose of the model as a projection input determines the requirements. On the one 
hand, the model must be of a kind that can be extrapolated in a meaningful and 
consistent way; on the other hand, it need only capture temporally robust associations, 
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not causal explanations. The model is fit to reconstructed educational attainment data 
for 178 countries for the period 1970–2010.  
3.1 Fitting Past Expansion 
The first question is which measure(s) to model directly, and which to derive. In the 
present context, educational growth could conceivably be modeled by projecting the 
number of people attaining each level, or the shares of different attainment groups 
among each cohort, or transitions between levels. There are arguments in favor of each 
choice. Modeling absolute numbers accounts for some of the absolute constraints on 
capacity expansion in the education sector, and might suggest a view that educational 
development is supply-driven. Transition rates between attainment levels arise naturally 
from the common approach to modeling within-school flows in terms of entry, 
promotion, repetition, and drop-out rates. We choose to focus on attainment shares 
among (five year) cohorts as the measure to be modeled directly. The distinct 
advantages are three-fold: firstly, in a world of declining fertility, supply-side 
constraints are expected to lose importance relative to social demand, especially at 
levels below tertiary, and normalizing the education model by population size makes it 
possible to specify it independently from the overall population growth model and its 
fertility assumptions. This breaks a potentially troublesome feedback loop in the 
projection method. Secondly, in contrast to transitions, attainment is directly a property 
of persons, and represents the outcome of the education model required for inclusion in 
the overall population projection (this also serves as an argument against examining 
enrolments, which are indeed a person characteristic, but not a stable one). Moreover, 
shares at different levels can be interpreted independently, whereas transitions are 
cumulative and their implications for attainment can only be understood as an ensemble.  
Having settled on attainment shares as the principal measure, the question arises 
whose attainment to model directly, or more specifically, which age group to focus on. 
It would be possible, of course, to separately model the attainment at different ages, but 
the possibility of contradictory results makes it an unattractive approach. Using a single 
reference age group, however, calls for a balancing act: younger ages reflect more 
closely the recent developments in the education system, while at older ages there is a 
greater chance of accurately capturing the maximal lifetime attainment. Here, we use 
the attainment share at ages 30–34 as the benchmark, in a compromise between these 
two concerns.  
An additional question concerns the levels to model explicitly. Separate models 
for different attainment levels risk creating inconsistent results, where the share of those 
with upper secondary or higher attainment is projected to be greater than the share with 
lower secondary or higher attainment, for example. This risk is greater the closer the 
levels in question are to each other. Instead of attempting a complex joint model that 
imposes ordering constraints, we estimate independent models for the sufficiently 
separated levels of completed primary, upper secondary, and tertiary education, which 
results in projections without inconsistent crossovers. We then interpolate the 
intermediary levels of lower secondary and incomplete primary education, with no 
education calculated as the residual. Specifically, the share of these intermediary levels 
among those with completed primary, but less than completed upper secondary 
schooling (in the case of lower secondary), and among those with less than completed 
 24 
primary schooling (in the case of incomplete primary), respectively, is held constant at 
the most recent value observed.  
Based on the discussion in Section 2.3, the model is designed to capture the 
intrinsic dynamics of the education sector, rather than the effect of external predictors 
(such as economic growth), that would then, in turn, need to be projected, raisinging 
additional questions of data reliability and endogeneity.  
The model assumed here effectively relates the growth over time in the share of 
30–34 year olds having reached a given attainment level or higher to the current level of 
said share. The relationship is such that growth is slowest for both very low and very 
high shares and fastest at middle levels, resulting in a sigmoid, trajectory over time. In 
the present case, this shape is parameterized as an (inverse) probit curve. The probit 
curvature was found during exploratory investigations to match the empirical patterns 
more closely than a logistic specification.  
Concretely, the observed data on the highest attainment are transformed into 
reversely-cumulated attainment shares such as “percentage with upper secondary or 
higher” and correspondingly for other attainment levels. These figures in the interval 
[0,1] are probit-transformed into unbounded numbers. An exact inverse-probit sigmoid-
curve would be perfectly linearized as a result, turned in other words into a straight line. 
Accordingly, a linear fit to the transformed data corresponds to an inverse-probit 
sigmoid-curve fitted to the original data. The linear predictor is taken to consist of an 
overall global component g, as well as region-specific and country-specific elements (r 
and c), all time-invariant, as well as random residuals epsilon at the level of country-
year dyads. Formally:  
 
Because we are not interested in lateral shifts in time, the data can be centered so 
that participation is 50 percent at time t0 for estimation purposes. In order to obtain 
distributional results to aid scenario creation, the above specification is estimated within 
a Bayesian framework. The priors for all parameters are normally distributed with zero 
means and half-Cauchy priors for the variances. The outcomes of the estimation are 
posterior probability distributions for the overall global, regional, and country-specific 
rates of educational growth.  
For the post-secondary education level, the attainment share is re-scaled so that 
complete saturation corresponds to 90% of a cohort attaining post-secondary education. 
This reflects the fact that, unlike lower levels of schooling, universalizing post-
secondary education is nowhere a policy target, and, on the contrary, the current 
frontrunners such as Singapore are debating whether to actively limit post-secondary 
expansion.  
Figure 8 shows the empirical pattern of attainment growth by level. The dashed 
line is a locally weighted scatterplot smoother (LOESS). The solid line displays the 
predicted growth based on only the global average term g in Formula 1. In other words, 
this represents the global average inverse-probit shaped expansion path. In terms of 
implied trajectories of educational growth over time, Figure 1 displays the observed 
country paths at the original scale, arranged around the hypothetical global average 
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trajectory. As is evident, even this simple, purely endogenous, model does a credible job 
of approximating the pattern in the data.  
 
Figure 8. Observed (dots), smoothed (dashed), and predicted (solid) 5-year attainment 
growth (in percentage points) as a function of attainment share already achieved.] 
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3.2 Projected Diffusion 
Our aim is to obtain projected attainment levels for all age groups for the period 2010-
2060. Extrapolating the above model in the first instance provides these only for the age 
group 30–34.  
Given the simplifying assumption that educational attainment is mostly 
complete by age 30-34, changes in the attainment shares at higher ages result from 
differential mortality and migration behavior between different education groups, rather 
than attainment transitions. Accordingly, the shares at higher ages derive from the 
general multi-state population projection and require no further input from the education 
projection itself and. 
Figure 9. Short-term reconciliation between projected attainment at age 30-34 and 
observed attainment at younger ages 
 
3.2.1 Reconciliation of Observations and Projections During Transition 
Phase 
Because it is time series of attainment at age 30-34 that is explicitly modeled and 
projected into the future, there is potential for disagreement with the observations of 
attainment at younger age groups. In principle, it is possible that the cohort 25-29 in the 
base year already has higher levels of attainment than the simple projection implies for 
the age group 30-34 five years later.  
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This affects only the first three projection steps, as the individuals who in the 
base year are located in the age groups 25-29, 20-24, and 15-19 have observed 
attainment shares that might be inconsistent with their projected attainment at age 30-34 
based on the simple projection. Beginning with the cohort that is aged 10-14 in the base 
year, there are no observations that could be at odds with the projected attainment at 
later ages.  
A two-step process ensures consistency along two directions. The first is along 
cohort lines. Since the highest level of education attained is non-decreasing with age, 
this is a logical requirement. It is achieved by adjusting the projection so that the share 
having achieved a given education level in a cohort is at all ages at least as high as the 
share observed in the base year.  
The second step ensures that the application of the first step does not result in 
fluctuations over time in attainment at a given age. While this is not a logical necessity 
since educational stagnation and even decline across cohorts are certainly possible in 
reality, this is done in the interest of coherence. Fluctuations around the central trend are 
possible, but the entire model is set up to project the long-term central trend, not short-
term fluctuations. Accordingly, the maximum is taken of the values resulting from a) 
the simple projection of attainment at age 30–34 over time, starting in the base year, and 
b) the attainment of younger age groups observed in the base year, brought forward 
along cohort lines.  
In effect, the local maximization approach to the first step corresponds to the 
assumption that, as far as possible, inconsistencies should be reconciled by adjusting the 
assumed timing of attainment, rather than the final level. Consider, for example, a 
situation in which the observed attainment at age 20–24 is higher than the projected 
attainment at this age, but lower than the projected final attainment at age 30–34. Our 
approach reconciles this by adjusting the timing of attainment so that sufficiently many 
attainment transitions are assumed to have occurred earlier than initially assumed, but 
without changing the overall number of transitions to higher levels. In principle, it 
would be equally possible to fix the timing schedule, in other words the assumed 
relationship between attainment at age 20–24 and final attainment at age 30–34, but to 
adjust the assumed final level so that the back-projected attainment at the younger age 
no longer falls below the observed level. The choice between the two approaches (and 
against a mixture of them) was dictated by the principle that the least certain parts of the 
model should be the first to be adjusted to accommodate contradictory information. In 
the present case, the timing schedules are reasonable a priori assumptions, while by 
contrast the projected final attainment levels at age 30–34 also incorporate modeling 
assumptions, and hence are also data-driven.  
3.2.2 Transition Schedules Below Age 30 
Attainment projections for age groups younger than 30 depend on the timing of 
attainment at different levels. If it were the case that all those who complete upper 
secondary school do so by the age of 24 at the oldest, then the share of those with 
completed secondary schooling among 25–29 year olds is equal to their projected share 
as 30–34 year olds five years later. These relations are only strict in the absence of 
educational mortality differentials. The error induced by ignoring mortality is marginal, 
however, since overall mortality at young adult ages is low.  
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The aggregation into five-year age groups complicates matters: even in the 
simplest case where everyone completes the upper secondary level at the nominally 
standard age of 18, for example, the age group 15–19 would include both individuals 
between the ages 15 and 17 who will complete the level but only in the future, and those 
aged 18 and 19 who have already graduated. The specification of attainment timing in 
terms of five-year age groups should take this into account.  
Here, the system of attainment age schedules is conditioned on the highest level 
attained by the age of 30–34. This means the schedules specify which attainment group 
those with post-secondary degrees by age 30–34 were in at ages 25–29, 20–24, and 15–
19, and similarly for those with upper secondary attainment and other levels at age 30–
34. Conditional on the shares at age 30–34, these schedules could, in principle, be 
converted into matrices of transition rates between education categories, one matrix per 
age group. The age-schedule characterization allows for a specification of assumptions 
that is more natural from an educational development point of view. The implied 
transition matrices are effectively parameterized by five parameters with a natural 
interpretation (the ultimate attainment shares). Many entries are either logically 
predetermined or straightforward to specify: the monotonicity of highest attainment 
over the life course implies a number of structural zeroes. 
The transition schedules are estimated for each country by taking the short-term 
projections for the age group 30-34 as given, and comparing them to the observed 
attainment at ages 25-29, 20-24, and 15-19 in the baseline year. Specifically, if 30 
percent are projected to have completed post-secondary attainment or higher by age 30-
34 in 2015, and 20 percent are observed to do so among 25-29 year olds in 2010, then 
the implied schedule is that, of those completing post-secondary, two-thirds do so 
between the ages of 25-29 and 30-34. A similar comparison is made for the age group 
30-34 in 2020 and the age group 20-24 in 2010, and for the age group 30-34 in 2025 
and the age group 15-19 in 2010. 
These schedules are not guaranteed to be consistent from a cohort perspective. 
In a second step, schedules are determined through optimization techniques that satisfy 
logical consistency constraints and are closest in absolute difference (over the entries) to 
the raw schedules found above. More precisely, a weighted average distance is 
minimized between the raw country-specific schedules and a standard set of schedules 
described below, with weights of 0.7 on the country-specific schedule and 0.3 on the 
standard schedules. This regularization step avoids some undesirable transition behavior 
that can occur in the raw schedules in countries whose baseline population attainment at 
younger ages is highly irregular due to rapid educational change, declining attainment, 
or possibly migration. 
The assumed schedules are designed to correspond to nominal graduation ages 
based on school entry at age six, with a stylized school system of 6+3+3 for primary, 
lower, and upper secondary schooling, and three years for a first post-secondary degree, 
while taking into account the age spread within five-year age groups. At the same time, 
it must be recognized that at the post-secondary level, there is no consensus that a 
“regular” education career requires higher education studies to immediately follow the 
completion of upper secondary schooling. Indeed, “late” post-secondary attainment, 
even above the age of 35 is substantial in some countries, including the USA.  
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The sensitivity of the population projections with respect to the assumptions 
concerning attainment timing is expected to be greater in the case of fertility than for 
mortality. Overall mortality is generally lowest at the young adult ages at which the 
assumptions apply. The greatest impact is expected to be on fertility and migration. 
However, this impact is moderated by the fact that absolute educational fertility 
differentials are smallest in the countries with high levels of post-secondary attainment 
and largest in those countries where the share of post-secondary graduates, and 
therefore the share of those whose attainment timing is most difficult to estimate, is 
relatively low. In general, the specification of assumptions in terms of age schedules 
conditional on ultimate attainment means that, in contrast to the alternative of 
specifying transition rates, specification errors do not cumulate. 
3.2.3 Convergence 
Due to the specification of the model, where countries' expansion parameters are 
estimated as coming from a shared statistical distribution (by gender and education 
level), the basic country estimates and, by implication, their projected trajectories, are 
not independent. Some “shrinkage” towards the overall mean occurs, reflecting the fact 
that a country with an exceptionally fast/slow historical expansion path may be assumed 
to have experienced a particularly fast/slow incidental spell in addition to having a 
fast/slow intrinsic momentum. 
However, the estimation model does not assume that countries become more 
similar over time. This is, nonetheless, something that may be assumed as a projection 
assumption. Here, it is the rates of change in probit-transformed attainment that undergo 
convergence, not the attainment levels directly. In other words, even if complete 
convergence were assumed, countries would still differ in attainment, and--due to the 
non-linear sigmoid expansion model--would still expand at different rates on the 
original scale of attainment shares, because even with identical rates on the transformed 
scale, countries at middle levels of attainment would increase their attainment share 
more rapidly than countries close to saturation. 
The case for assuming a weak convergence over a very long time horizon is 
different from the case for assuming relatively rapid complete convergence (within a 
few decades). The first is a “regularization” of the projection rather than a reflection of a 
strong assumption of mechanisms leading to convergence. In the absence of any 
convergence, countries that have undergone a recent decline in educational attainment 
would be projected to undergo an educational collapse if the decline were extrapolated 
without a corrective. Assuming a slight level of convergence to the global median 
ensures that such countries' trajectories are merely stagnant. Accordingly, a slow 
convergence in rates, namely complete convergence by 2100, is assumed for all 
scenarios. By contrast, the central scenario is one where globalization trends in 
educational development result in a convergence in rates by 2060. 
A separate issue is that of convergence of educational attainment of males and 
females within a given country. The initial estimates of the trajectories are independent 
for each gender. Indeed, historical patterns show that large gender differences in 
attainment can occur and remain for decades at all education levels. Gender difference 
in primary school attendance in countries with low educational development in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere are systematically highlighted by 
international development agencies. But large gaps at the post-compulsory stage can 
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also be observed in industrialized countries. Nevertheless, for projection purposes, it is 
appropriate to include some degree of linkage between female and male attainment 
levels in a given country to avoid a situation where gaps are projected that fall outside 
the range of precedent. Here, male and female attainment, in terms of the share attaining 
or exceeding each level of education, are projected to converge to the gender-averaged 
attainment by the end of the projection horizon in 2060. 
3.3 Scenario Definition 
Basing the projection on the median estimates of the country slopes corresponds to a 
“business as usual” setting. One of the aims of the exercise is to investigate the possible 
consequences of more rapid, or on the contrary more laggard, educational growth.  
3.3.1 Central Scenario: Global Education Trend (GET) 
In the GET scenario, the attainment profile of future cohorts is based on the median 
parameter estimates of the model estimated above. In that sense, while not interpretable 
as the “most likely” scenario in a probabilistic sense, it can be interpreted as the 
scenario that reality is equally likely to exceed or fall short of. 
In policy terms, this may be interpreted as “business as usual”. This does not, 
however, imply a static perspective. On the contrary, even if the pace of educational 
expansion statistically depends on the level already attained in an endogenous fashion, 
the theoretical discussion in Section 2 makes it clear that this expansion, though 
statistically unsurprising, nevertheless has to be actively produced by the actors 
involved. It is therefore a scenario of sustained effort. At the same time, being based on 
the average performance of the most recent decades, including at the country-specific 
level, this scenario does factor in the inevitable setbacks and mismatches between 
ambitious policy targets and actual change “on the ground”.  
Accordingly, the assumed and implied overall development will continue to 
have both light and shade. Steady progress may be achieved in terms of overall 
education participation, but some groups will not benefit as much economic and less 
tangible rewards from the schooling they receive as they could, due to low quality of 
education. As a result, increasing educational aspirations from generation to generation 
cannot be taken as a given. Technological progress and social innovation will continue 
to be made, but their diffusion is uneven. 
3.3.2 High Scenario: Fast Benchmark  
In this scenario, the most rapid country-specific expansion parameters are applied to all 
countries throughout the projection period. In other words, all countries follow the 
educational development paths taken in the past by the frontrunners in East and South-
East Asia. 
Note that due to the nonlinearity in the expansion paths, this does not mean that 
all countries proceed at the same pace on the original scale of attainment shares, much 
less that all countries have identical attainment profiles at the end of the projection. 
In policy terms, this corresponds to a scenario where there is an immediate and 
concerted global effort to supply a sufficient number of schools, expand teacher 
training, and pursue the enrolment and retention of marginalized and disadvantaged 
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subpopulations. At the global level, assuming that all countries simultaneously and 
successfully replicate the educational growth of the Republic of Korea or Singapore is, 
of course, implausible. This scenario therefore purely serves the function of supplying 
an upper bound on the effect educational expansion could possibly exert on overall 
projection outcomes. 
Since educational development is locked into a tight relationship of mutual 
feedback with overall socio-economic change, such a scenario of rapid educational 
expansion can only be meaningfully interpreted in an assumed context of substantial 
transformation of global society, partly as a prerequisite and partly as an effect of 
explosive educational growth. It may therefore be assumed, in the context of the Fast 
Benchmark scenario, that a focused global effort is made not only to finally achieve the 
“Education For All” aims initially set by the international community for 2015 in terms 
of universalizing primary education, but that similar schemes follow at the secondary 
level. The unconditional success of such schemes on a global level would facilitate the 
achievement of other development goals relating to poverty reduction and global health. 
In particular, the scenario implies the essential disappearance of female disadvantage in 
education, with significant implications for female empowerment and possibly the ease 
of diffusion for social innovation. This scenario also assumes a substantial reduction in 
the occurrence of man-made crises and conflict that have set back educational 
development in the past. 
3.3.3 Low Scenarios  
Constant Enrolment Rates (CER) 
For the CER scenario, the attainment shares at age 30-34 of future cohorts are fixed at 
the levels observed in the base year (but adjusted where necessary if younger age groups 
in the base year already exhibit higher than predicted attainment).  
While in general terms, this is a lower bound scenario that is likely to be 
exceeded in most places, it is not necessarily a “worst case” scenario. Indeed, in 
countries where cohort-on-cohort population growth remains high, schooling even a 
constant proportion of increasing successive cohorts may require substantial 
investments in capacity expansion. It is quite possible for an actual country trajectory to 
fall behind even the CER scenario if the education system is under pressure from 
population growth, disasters, emergencies, or conflict. Nevertheless, constant rates at 
the global level would correspond to an unprecedented period of stagnation. 
Constant Enrolment Numbers (CEN) 
Under the CEN scenario, the absolute numbers of individuals in each 5-year age cohort 
that complete a given level of schooling by age 30-34 remains constant. 
To give it a substantive interpretation, such a scenario may be approximated if 
educational growth is limited by capacity constraints. A given number of university 
places for example, coupled with an underdeveloped private sector to cater to potential 
excess demand for them, means student numbers may be stable regardless of the size of 
school-leaving cohorts. In contrast to the CER scenario, where fixed participation rates 
imply that absolute enrolments fluctuate as a function of cohort size, under CEN the 
reverse is true: absolute numbers are fixed, and together with cohort sizes they 
determine the rates. 
 32 
Structurally, CEN is a pessimistic scenario in that the education category that is 
not subject to the constancy constraint, and that therefore expands or contracts to 
accommodate changing cohort sizes, is the category of “no education”. However, in 
some circumstances, this case may lead to greater educational growth than the CER 
scenario, specifically when birth cohorts are becoming successively smaller. However, 
because the educationally least developed countries are at the same time among those 
with the highest fertility, however, the CEN scenario is particularly negative at the low 
end. In these countries, the implied participation rates amount to a deterioration of 
current conditions. 
An actual path close to either the CER or CEN scenarios would likely represent 
a major obstacle to socio-economic development. A parent generation with a stagnant or 
even increasing share of poorly-educated would not help the further diffusion of 
improving child health, for example. And an increasing supply of unskilled labor would 
at the same time provide little incentive for a modernization of the national economy 
and also depress wages at the low end. 
4 Implications 
At the country level, there is no lack of policy questions that can benefit from an 
informed estimate of future educational attainment. A few examples among many will 
suffice here. The question of how many older persons there will be relative to the 
number of school children and students in higher education will be a crucial part of the 
political economy context for education spending in the future. Anticipating when and 
where public support is likely to shift away from public education as a spending priority 
towards public provision of services for the elderly is a crucial strategic parameter for 
educators. The education profile of the senior majority itself is also likely to matter, as 
will their family relationships, i.e. whether the higher education students are still 
disproportionately members of families that contain the most politically active and 
sophisticated seniors, or whether, due to a combination of demography (the poor have 
more children) and educational progress, the student body does not seem like kin to 
these seniors. 
The future education profile of the population will also matter in terms of how, 
through ageing of the generations that benefited from the rapid expansion in higher 
education, the average “vintage” of degrees and qualifications in the population will 
increase. In partially predictable ways, the importance of life-long learning vis-a-vis 
formal schooling for the young will increase almost automatically, simply because there 
will be relatively more older adults, and more of them than today will be in knowledge 
industries and qualified by degrees that have a shorter “half-life”. 
Teacher recruitment is another case in point. To base recruitment on present (or 
worse: recent!) teacher shortages is to lag eternally behind. Matters are worse regarding 
recruiting students into teacher training. Ideally, human resource planning for the 
teaching force would take into account demand in the coming 40 years (as well as 
estimates of retirement, attrition and so on). Even ignoring the students, aligning teacher 
recruitment purely with current needs rather than taking a sufficiently long-term view 
would risk creating problems that are both foreseeable and avoidable. For example, if an 
unbalanced age structure among the teaching force is created, the situation may arise 
where there is a shortage of head teachers (because the pool of potential candidates who 
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are neither too old nor too inexperienced is small) even if there is an oversupply of 
teachers overall. 
There are also theoretical implications at the aggregate level. On average, 
educational expansion tends to follow a sigmoid diffusion pattern. Taken at face value, 
this implies that a cluster of countries with similarly, but not exactly equally, low levels 
of educational attainment, will, by this measure, move apart before moving closer again, 
as one passes the “take-off” point before the other. In other words, it is not unreasonable 
to expect that inequality between countries that are only beginning to embark on a path 
towards universalizing schooling will initially increase, even if all of them are on (the 
same) track. This has implications for the direction of international support.  
Moreover, extreme cases illustrate the benefit of projecting long term scenarios 
even if they are purely hypothetical and not intended as reasonable forecasts, because 
they provide bounds on what can be achieved. Even if Niger stepped up to the 
extraordinary pace of South Korea, given its current stocks, it would still be far behind 
the international average even two generations from now. 
 
 
Figure 10. Projected education composition of Niger in 2060 under the Fast Benchmark 
scenario. 
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In fact, together with only a handful of other countries, in relative terms Niger 
would be even further behind than it is now, because the global benchmark may well 
move faster than the late-comers. This means we have to acknowledge what it means to 
be “in it for the long haul.” This example also raises the question of how much 
momentum is likely to remain behind international support for educational expansion 
once it has become a minority problem of a few marginalized nations. It also means that 
eventually, adult education will have to become a bigger part of educational 
development work than initial schooling.  
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